Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.

摘要

An incomplete information environment is one where at least some of the participants do not possess all the relevant data. Much interest has been devoted in recent years to the analysis of such situations. In the economic theory literature, for example: the principal-agent problem; the theory of auctions; signalling (e.g., in insurance markets); rational expectations equilibria; and so on. What are the main difficulties in such problems. First, consider the informed persons--those who know more than others. On one hand, it is to their advantage to make use of their additional information (in order to improve their own final outcome). On the other hand, by doing so they actually reveal this information--and their relative advantage vanishes. Thus--what is the good of being more informed, if one cannot profit from it. This type of conflict is an essential issue in the analysis of incomplete information environments. (Author)