Exit Strategy Not a Winning Strategy. Intelligence Lessons from the British 'Emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67.

摘要

The British Army is often praised for its skill in small wars, or counterinsurgencies (COIN). Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order across a global empire with a relatively small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance of great British military theorists and an inherent flexibility present within a small army that is used to adapting to overcome adversity. However, this view is challenged by recent scholars who suggest that the United Kingdom's record in COIN is not one of universal success. This thesis examines a less prominent British campaign -- the war in South Arabia or the 'Aden Emergency.' It was fought against a complex local enemy that was supported by a strong regional power in the Middle East with a public timeline for British withdrawal. The thesis focuses on the performance of the British intelligence organization in South Arabia during this campaign. There is much to learn from this campaign, including extreme rural and urban terrain; cultural, religious, and linguistic differences; and an international political climate that condemned British actions but was sympathetic to the insurgency and its external sponsors. Finally, the issue of organizational learning is examined to identify the extent to which the British military was prepared to identify and address its experiences and incorporate lessons learned into its institutions.