Time-on-Target: Tactical Organization and the Massing of Divisional Field Artillery Fires on the AirLand Battlefield

摘要

Given that mass fires remain desirable and may be feasible, this study asks: what principles must govern the tactical organization of artillery at division level to mass. This monograph is a historical analysis of Soviet and American World War II experiences in the organization of artillery at division level to mass fires. Both country's artillery experiences, organization, methodology, and techniques are examined to isolate relevant sets of principles for organizing artillery tactically at division to mass. These principles are then constrasted to reveal similarities and differences to isolate a set of historically derived principles. These principles are then compared to evolving battlefield changes since World War II, AirLand Battle doctrine and a vision of the future battlefield to determine what effect they have on the historical imperatives. Conclusions drawn from this analysis to organize artillery at division to mass include: the necessity of maximum centralized control by division, specifically fire planning, first priority in calls-for-fire, and positioning authority; the retention of sufficient artillery in general support; and the necessity to weight the main effort decisively with the fires of the general support artillery.