Unit Manning System Field Evaluation

摘要

This report describes the realization of human dimensions expectations in the 7th Infantry Div. (Light) at Fort Ord, CA. The findings point up deficiencies in small unit cohesion, leadership, and Army practice which have long been known and often addressed, but never solved. The critique is of the way the U.S. Army does business. The central thesis is that, while the division succeeded in achieving all conventional criteria set for it, it failed in the human dimensions. That failure came not from want of caring and dedication, but from the way the Army trains and constrains its leaders. In creating the first new light infantry division the Army launched two experiments: 1) to take a conventional infantry division, down-size it, refit it, train it, and certify it combat ready in 18 months; this experiment succeeded. 2) To generate fighting power in the new light division with greater reliance on people rather than on materiel and weapons systems. A 1984 white paper on light infantry divisions proposed combining three-year personnel stabilization (i.e., COHORT battalions), intensive training, and a paradigm of positive leadership to develop 'high performing' divisions with ordinary soldiers; this attempt failed to meet its stated objectives. Keywords: Army family; Army personnel; Battalion rotation; Bonding cohesion; Combat stress; Company rotation; Community services; Family support; Family support groups; Leadership; Motivation morale; One station unit training (OSUT); Soldier survey; Military effectiveness; Army training; Military psychology. (EDC)