Army Flying Hour Program: Is the Prediction Methodology Flawed

摘要

The Army Flying Hour Program has evolved over the years into an extremely sensitive issue for the Army staff. It is a large budget item - over 392 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1990, growing to over 425 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1995. The sensitivity in Congress and the Department of Defense arises from an inability to accurately predict and manage annual flying hour requirements and costs. The Army has underflown the budgeted program during the past five years by approximately 637,000 hours. This study seeks to examine the Army's methodology for predicting and budgeting flying hour requirements and to recommend improvements in the development process. The study will also highlight and contrast the forecasting procedures at the unit, major command (MACOM), and Department of the Army levels. This comparison is critical to an understanding of the problem. Although many factors impact on the development and execution of a flying hour program, I approached the subject matter from a senior management viewpoint. The dependent variables of repair parts cost and availability, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, assigned strength postures (both pilot and maintenance personnel), flight simulator availability, and even weather impact heavily on a flying hour program's viability. If, however, the Army is to sustain its aviation combat readiness during projected periods of constrained resources, then it must do a better job of predicting flying hour requirements. The scrutiny of the budget at all levels dictates that we do so. (SDW)