Korea - 1950: The Decision to Invade the North...(What Would Carl Have Thought).

摘要

Sunday, 0400 hours, 25 June 1950...the assault came without warning. Eight North Korean infantry divisions exploded across the 38th Parallel into South Korea through gaps torn by armor and artillery. By 0900 hours, the city of Kaesong (26 miles north of Seoul) had fallen. By 1200 hours the airfields at Kimpo and Seoul were under attack. By 2400 hours, with North Korean armor 17 miles from Seoul, U.S. Ambassador Muccio ordered the evacuation of American dependents from Seoul and Inchon. By 0045 hours, 26 June 1950, the Far East Air Force (FEAT) had orders to provide fighter cover for the evacuation. A full-scale invasion of South Korea had begun and U.S. forces would soon be engaged in earnest. With U.S. forces engaged in this post-WW II 'police action,' what kind of war was this to be and what were its objectives. Prior to committing forces, had the contemporary American political and military leadership agreed to a 'police action' that Clausewitz would define as directed at the 'total defeat of an enemy,' or did the leadership view it more as a war to be conducted with 'limited aims.' Had this 'first of all strategic questions' that Clausewitz posed been successfully answered. If so, was the answer the same for both American political and military leaders. Most importantly, was the decision to invade North Korea in September 1950 and drive north toward the Chinese border sound if the nature of the war itself had not been determined. This essay addresses these questions and presents the case that the American decision to invade North Korea and carry the ground war beyond the 38th Parallel toward the Chinese border was inconsistent with the political realities of September 1950. To contrast the conflicting notions of political and military objectives, the author traces hostilities during two time periods: 25 June 1950-15 September 1950, and 28 September 1950-25 November 1950.