Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II

摘要

The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkage between tactics and strategy, and for its application of operational art. The Red Army's development of deep battle during the interwar years, and its refinement during World War II, is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union's military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a theoretical level to a politically controlled strategic doctrine, and then emerged as an offensive-biased operational mindset. If Finland is overlooked, it resulted in World War II deep battle success. However, the Red Army's execution and application of operational art is overstated when viewed through the lens of the 1939-40 Winter War and later in the Finnish theater of World War II. Despite 20 years of theoretical development and recent combat in Manchuria, the Soviets were badly bloodied by the Finns during the Winter War. Further, after four years of war experience fighting the Germans and having arguably 'perfected' deep battle, they never achieved any real depth in the 1944 summer offensive that forced Finland out of the war. Nevertheless, the Red Army achieved victory in both Finnish campaigns through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland's systematic withdrawal prevented the destruction of its army, which was the key Soviet operational objective. Within 5 years the Soviet Union defeated Finland in two wars, but it failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle, and by its own definition 'operational art.' A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and her realization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals. This experience questions the importance that Soviet doctrine placed on operational art, and highlights the primacy of competent strategic planning.