General George Crook, The Indian-Fighting Army and Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: A Case for Developmental Immaturity.

摘要

In the latter half of the 19th century, the army fought almost 1,000 engagements against the Indians, most of which were fought conventionally against an unconventional foe. But as it had for the previous century, the army failed to elaborate an unconventional warfare doctrine and as a consequence, entered the 20th century with only a conventional concept of war. This study examines the army environment in the period 1865-1890, as well as George Crook, perhaps the greatest Indian-fighter of all time, and the unconventional strategy that made him successful. By placing both the army and Crook within the context of the time, factors which could have reasonably resulted in their failure to produce an unconventional warfare doctrine are identified. The study suggests that during the period the military had an incomplete and immature concept of war as a consequence of its view of the world and its war experience. Following the Civil War and the return of the army to the frontier, it became evident that the Indian wars would soon be over, and the army began the search for a mission which would ensure its continued existence in society.