Cooperative Trust Games.

摘要

In certain multi-agent systems, the interactions between agents result in the formation of relationships, which can be leveraged for cooperative or collaborative activities. These relationships generally constrain individual-agent actions, since relationships imply that at least one contract (or mutual agreement) between the agents must exist. There is always some uncertainty as to whether or not either agent can or will satisfy some contract requirement -- especially at the creation of a new contract. But in order to maintain the existence of a contract, each agent must overcome this uncertainty and assume that the other will do the same. The mechanism that facilitates this 'act of faith' is generally regarded as 'trust.' In essence, each agent (whether a person or organization) in a relationship mutually trusts that the loss of some control will result in cooperative gains that neither agent could achieve alone. This chapter intends to show how one could mathematically describe these types of trust-based interactions via the cooperative trust game to predict coalition formation and disbanding. It presents a rigorous treatment of coalition formation using cooperative game theory as the underlying mathematical framework. It is important to highlight that cooperative game theory is significantly different than the more widely recognized competitive (non-cooperative) game theory. Cooperative game theory focuses on what groups of self-interested agents can achieve.