Reviewing Command and Control for a Heavy Brigade: Tweaking the Design of the Forward Command Posts.

摘要

The forward command posts (tactical command post and command group) of the heavy brigade are not configured to enhance command and control for the brigade commander. Since the 1950's, the US Army has increased the number of command posts with equipment and personnel to match. Although these changes were made to help the brigade commander, they have detracted from the commander's ability to command and control his subordinate task forces. Initially this monograph will review theory, and doctrine on command and control in general and then specifically for heavy brigades. By using criteria derived from Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations an examination of two historical cases, one from World War II and the other from Desert Storm will show how the changes to forward command posts have not enhanced command and control for the brigade commander. The monograph concludes that the forward command posts for a heavy brigade need to be reconfigured based on evidence. The U.S. Army needs to authorize the heavy brigade commanders armored fighting vehicles that have mobility and can defend themselves on the battlefield. Communications must be designed to be simple and redundant relying primarily on voice communications; computers are better left in the main and rear command posts. The U.S. Army must reconfigure the forward command posts based on criteria taken from doctrinal manuals, after-action reports, and secondary sources. Continuing to exercise command and control in the current configuration may prevent heavy maneuver brigades from achieving a quick decisive victory that is the U.S. Army's primary focus as based on the coordinating draft of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.