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The Indefinability and unintelligibility of Delusion

机译:妄想的不确定性和不可理解性

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In what follows, I accept that Gorski is right to say that true delusion arises from a 'primary phenomenon' of experience whose 'specific difference'-its pathological character-cannot be further analyzed. Indeed, I suspect that, far from being a cop out, arriving at the understanding that the delusionality of primary delusion is indefinable is tantamount to genuinely appreciating just how fundamental a disturbance to the mind delusion represents. Whereas belief may take many forms-such as true or false, hasty, convinced, wavering, or long-standing-while remaining true to itself qua belief, delusionality challenges its very standing as belief. At its core, that is, it seems to me that delusion represents not merely an unusual 'take' on the world, but something that starts to make us question whether what we have here can genuinely be called a 'take' at all.
机译:在下文中,我接受戈尔斯基的说法是正确的,真正的妄想源自经验的“主要现象”,其“特殊差异”(即病理特征)无法进一步分析。的确,我怀疑,远非单纯的解决方案,而是认识到原始妄想的妄想性是无法定义的,无异于真正地理解了心理妄想所代表的根本性干扰。信念可能采取多种形式,如对或错,草率,被说服,摇摆不定或长期存在,同时又对信念保持真实,而妄想则挑战了其作为信念的地位。从本质上讲,在我看来,妄想不仅代表着世界上不寻常的“冒险”,而且还使我们开始怀疑我们在这里拥有的东西是否真的可以称为“冒险”。

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