Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making

摘要

An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on, the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times 'oyerlook' good solutions to fundamental, social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making—virtual bargaining—in which individuals decide among a set of moves on the basis of what they would agree to do if they could openly bargain. The core principles of a formal account are outlined (vis-à-vis the notions of 'feasible agreement' and explicit negotiation) and further illustrated with the introduction of a new game, dubbed the 'Boobytrap game' (a modification on the canonical Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm). In the first empirical data of how individuals play the Boobytrap game, participants' experimental choices accord well with a virtual bargaining perspective, but do not match predictions from a standard Nash, account. Alternative frameworks are discussed, with speaific empirical tests between these and virtual bargaining identified as future research directions. Lastly, it is proposed that virtual bargaining underpins a vast range of human activities, from social decision-making to joint action and communication.