Sovereignty and subjectivity

摘要

Since the linguistic turn, the subject has been shaken from its Cartesian foundation, and is decentred. But, to be the socially and legally recognisable person one is supposed to be, the subject must be ruled as if a reified identity in the public space. This presupposes a Sovereign in possession of knowledge about the identities of subjects. But the instantiation of sovereignty depends in turn upon a people in whose name sovereignty is instituted and its actions performed. So neither should the Sovereign be reified, as if it were a fixed identity and source of power. It too may be deconstructed. The present argument begins from the hypothesis that 'to be is to be ruled', but only to falsify it. Employing initially Agamben's theories of sovereignty, the subjectivity of the sovereign is also problematised. Using psychoanalytic theory, this leads to a view of sovereignty and subjectivity as mutually constitutive.