Airmen have always hoped that airpower would lower the numbers killed in war--on both sides. Before World War II, U.S. air leaders argued that airpower would shorten wars and make them less bloody. They theorized that it was possible, in essence, to shoot the gun out of the enemy's hand -- to disarm him by disrupting his industrial production. This was the doctrine of precision, high-altitude bombardment of enemy industry that the Army Air Forces (AAF) took into World War II. World War II proved to be far different than the predictions. The AAF quickly discovered that German defenses were far stronger than expected, and losses were severe: In the Schweinfurt mission of Aug. 17, 1943, 60 B-17s and nearly 600 crewmen were lost -- more than 20 percent of the attacking force. Nonetheless, air leaders clung tenaciously to their daylight precision-bombing doctrine. As the war progressed, technology allowed more accuracy, but unquestionably, many civilians died in the bombing attacks. The same was true in the attacks on Japan.
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