Conservation Regulation: Ohio Oil and Gas Commission Administrative Law: Appeal; Proper Parties

摘要

In 2004, Summitcrest executes a lease that is eventually assigned to Chesapeake. Chesapeake applied to the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (Division) for a drilling permit under Ohio Rev. Code § 1509.06. In March 2012, the Chief of the Division issues the permit and Summitcrest appealed that decision to the Oil & Gas Commission (Commission). Under Ohio Rev. Code § 1509.36, the Chief is the appellee in appeals from orders of the Chief. The Division filed a motion to dismiss based upon its conclusion that the Commission is not authorized to review well permit decisions. Chesapeake joined in the Division's motion to dismiss that was made to the Commission. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss, but eventually upheld the permit issuance decision. Chesapeake then .filed an action seeking a writ of prohibition against the Commission from exercising any jurisdiction over the matter. In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Chesapeake must show that the Commission is exercising quasi-judicial power, that power is not authorized by law and delaying the writ would result in injury. The issue is whether the Commission "patently and unambiguously" lacked jurisdiction over Summitcrest's appeal. While Ohio Rev. Code § 1509.36 allows a person adversely affected by an order of the Chief to have that order reviewed by the Commission, a drilling permit is not considered to be an order of the Chief. Ohio Rev. Code. § 1509.06(F). The court interprets these two provisions in pari materia, namely by having § 1509.36 grant general jurisdiction to the Commission and then having § 1509.06(F) divest the Commission of jurisdiction over a number of permit decisions and other orders. Since the issuance of a permit is not an order of the Chief, it is not reviewable by the Commission so the writ of prohibition is granted.