Mineral Reservations and Exceptions: Mineral Rights; Strohacker Doctrine

摘要

Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to the oil and gas rights in land that their predecessors-in-interest had acquired by a warranty deed in 1934 from the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Union Pacific). The deed reserved to Union Pacific "all of the minerals, upon in or under the said land." The existing oil and gas lessees of Union Pacific were also defendants. Plaintiffs contended that the oil and gas rights were not reserved by Union Pacific in the mineral reservation in the 1934 deed under the Strohacker doctrine but passed to the grantees and ultimately to the plaintiffs through their chain of title. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Held: affirmed. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that summary judgment to determine the scope of a reservation of minerals under Arkansas' Strohacker doctrine is error in the absence of a factual inquiry into whether oil and gas was a mineral in commercial and legal usage in the area at the time the deed was executed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the favor of the defendants. In Sheppardv. lappa, 133 S.W.2d 860,866 (1939) this court held that a reservation of "mineral rights" in a 1937 deed reserved the oil and gas without application of the contemporaneous legal and commercial usage test of Strohacker. The Arkansas case law on the Strohacker doctrine indicates that sometime between 1905 and 1937, it became common knowledge in Arkansas that a generic reservation of mineral rights included oil and gas. Although not binding precedent on this court, the federal courts applying Arkansas law have drawn a similar conclusion. The Eight Circuit held that a 1936 reservation of minerals includes oil and gas as a matter of law in Arkansas. Griffis v. Anadarko E.P., LP., 606 F.3d 973,178 0.&G.R. 226 (8th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the court holds that the 1934 reservation in issue included oil and gas as a matter of law.