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Mineral Leases: Ownership of Water Sights

机译:矿产租赁:水景的所有权

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For a recitation of the facts of this case see the summary of the Court of Appeals opinion at 165 O.&G.R. 788. Held: reversed. The court adds mat Inspiration's interest in the minerals arose from a lease of the owner of five patented mining claims owned by Patterson. Pursuant to those mining claims, there are mill sites under federal law where the mining claimant may make use of the surface for mining and milling purposes. The relationship between Inspiration, as lessor, and the Partnership, as lessee determines the ownership of the water rights. If Inspiration is the owner of the water rights at the time the lease terminates, than Hydro is the present owner, but if the Partnership is the owner of the water rights, than Gray is the present owner. The Court of Appeals opinion is that the water rights developed on Inspiration's mill sites are "appurtenant" or "necessarily linked" to the associated patented and unpatented federal raining claims. Hydro argues that without the water rights it will necessarily lose the mill sites and therefore lose its ability to mine. While federal lands are involved, water rights are determined by looking to state law. New Mexico follows the doctrine of prior appropriation which gives priority rights to the party who first diverts the water to a beneficial use. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court issues an important water law decision. Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSC-038, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P.3d 882. The central feature of New Mexico's water rights system is the separate and distinct ownership of a water right from the ownership of the land. Thus, an owner of land does not necessarily have within its bundle of sticks, a water right. The one exception to the separate nature of a water right is a water right that is used in conjunction with irrigated acreage. This exception is legislatively recognized, while there is no such recognition for a mining exception. In Walker, the court said that having a water right did not necessarily mean that one has a grazing right. This case is the converse proposition, namely does the ownership of an interest in land carry with it a water right where the water is allegedly necessary to the use of the land. The New Mexico Supreme Court answers that question as it did in Walker, namely that unless specifically mentioned a conveyance of a interest in land, be it surface or mineral, will not necessarily convey a water right. In this case the quitclaim deed from Inspiration to Hydro does not explicitly convey distinct water rights. So even if Inspiration owned the water rights at the time of lease expiration it did not convey those rights to Hydro. Even if necessary for the beneficial use of the land, a water right will not follow the conveyance of that land with the sole exception for the conveyance of irrigated land. The court adds that Hydro's dire consequences argument regarding the loss of its mill sites is overstated since federal regulations allow a mining claimant a number of uses in order to keep the mill site, other than direct mining activities. The Supreme Court also rejects the Court of Appeals finding that Hydro has title to the water rights because the Partnership was an agent of Inspiration due to the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals suggests that a leasehold relationship creates a presumption of agency, while the New Mexico Supreme Court says that the cases implicate the opposite presumption. An agency relationship shouldnot be inferred from a lease that is silent on the subject be it a mineral lease or some other type of lease. While a lessee may owe some express and/or implied duties to the lessor, those implied duties do not create an agency relationship. The principal/agency relationship is fiduciary in nature and almost all courts reject the notion that an oil and gas, or mining, lease creates a fiduciary obligation on behalf of the lessee. Since the Partnership was not an agent of Inspiration and tha
机译:有关本案事实的叙述,请参见上诉法院意见书摘要,载于165 O.&G.R.。 788.举行:撤消。法院补充说,Inspiration在矿产中的权益来自Patterson拥有的五项专利采矿权所有人的租赁。根据这些采矿索赔,根据联邦法律,有一些磨矿场,采矿索赔人可以利用该表面进行采矿和磨矿。作为出租人的灵感与作为承租人的合伙企业之间的关系决定了水权的所有权。如果Inspiration是租赁终止时水权的所有者,那么Hydro是当前所有者,但是如果Partnership是水权的所有者,则Gray是当前所有者。上诉法院的意见是,Inspiration的磨煤机厂址开发的水权与相关的专利和未专利的联邦降雨请求“相关”或“有必要联系”。 Hydro辩称,如果没有水权,必将失去磨矿场址,从而丧失其开采能力。当涉及联邦土地时,水权是通过寻求州法律来确定的。新墨西哥州遵循事先分配原则,该原则赋予首先将水转用于有益用途的当事方以优先权。上诉法院作出裁决后,新墨西哥州最高法院发布了一项重要的水法裁决。 Walker诉美国,2007-NMSC-038,142 N.M. 45,162 P.3d882。新墨西哥州水权制度的主要特征是水权与土地所有权的区别和独特。因此,土地所有者不一定在其捆绑中拥有水权。水权独立性质的一个例外是与灌溉面积结合使用的水权。该例外在法律上得到承认,而对于采矿例外则没有这种承认。在沃克,法院说拥有水权并不一定意味着有人拥有放牧权。这种情况是相反的主张,即土地权益的所有权是否附带有水权,据称水是使用土地所必需的。新墨西哥州最高法院像在沃克中一样回答了这个问题,即除非特别提及对土地权益的转让,无论是地表还是矿产,都不一定是水权。在这种情况下,从灵感到水电的放弃权契约没有明确地传达出明显的水权。因此,即使Inspiration在租赁到期时拥有水权,也不会将这些权利转让给Hydro。即使为了土地的有益利用而必需,水权也不会跟随该土地的运输,唯一的例外是灌溉土地的运输。法院补充说,水电公司关于其磨矿场损失的可怕后果论点被夸大了,因为联邦法规允许采矿索赔人有多种用途来保留磨矿场,而不是直接采矿活动。最高法院还驳回上诉法院的裁定,认为该公司拥有水权,因为根据租赁协议,该合伙企业是Inspiration的代理人。上诉法院建议,租赁关系会导致代理的推定,而新墨西哥州最高法院则表示,这些案件牵涉到相反的推定。不应从对主题保持沉默的租赁中推断出代理关系,无论是矿物租赁还是其他类型的租赁。虽然承租人可能欠出租人一些明示和/或隐含的责任,但这些隐含的责任并没有建立代理关系。委托/代理关系本质上是受托关系,几乎所有法院都拒绝有关石油和天然气或采矿租约代表承租人产生受托义务的观点。由于该合作伙伴关系不是灵感和行动的代理

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