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首页> 外文期刊>Rural Cooperatives >Sharing the North Fork Canyon Run: Insights from Game Theory for Cooperatives
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Sharing the North Fork Canyon Run: Insights from Game Theory for Cooperatives

机译:分享北叉峡谷之旅:合作社博弈论的启示

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摘要

It is pulling that many businesses and individuals forgo opportunities to join or organize cooperatives when such actions would benefit them. One reason for such missed opportunities is that "go-it-alone" decisions sometimes offer more immediate payoffs, or more certainty of outcome, than do efforts that involve sharing resources or participating in orderly marketing efforts. Game Theory analysis helps identify situations that may lead to coordinated decisions among various "players," depending on the way incentives are structured. An incentive structure can be conveniently displayed in a 2 x 2 pay-off matrix. These matrices provide a way to distinguish between "dominated" and "contingent" choices, which is a key to understanding the prospects for coordinated decisions. This analysis will be applied in this article to hypothetical rafting businesses that share a thin strip of white water on the North Fork Canyon Run.
机译:令人震惊的是,许多企业和个人放弃了加入或组织合作社的机会,而这些行动会使他们受益。错过这种机会的原因之一是,“孤身一人”的决策有时会比涉及共享资源或参与有序营销工作的努力提供更多的直接收益或结果的确定性。博弈论分析有助于确定可能导致各种“参与者”之间协调决策的情况,具体取决于激励措施的构成方式。激励结构可以方便地以2 x 2的回报矩阵显示。这些矩阵提供了一种区分“主导”和“或有”选择的方法,这是理解协调决策前景的关键。该分析将在本文中应用于假设的漂流企业,这些企业在北叉峡谷滑道上共享一小段白水。

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