首页> 外文期刊>Management science: Journal of the Institute of Management Sciences >Strategic manipulation of Internet opinion forums: Implications for consumers and firms
【24h】

Strategic manipulation of Internet opinion forums: Implications for consumers and firms

机译:互联网舆论论坛的战略操纵:对消费者和企业的启示

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

There is growing evidence that consumers are influenced by Internet-based opinion forums before making a variety of purchase decisions. Firms whose products are being discussed in such forums are therefore tempted to manipulate consumer perceptions by posting costly anonymous messages that praise their products. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the impact of such behavior on firm profits and consumer surplus. There are three main results. First, if every firm's manipulation strategy is a monotonically increasing (decreasing) function of that firm's true quality, strategic manipulation of online forums increases (decreases) the information value of a forum to consumers. This result implies the existence of settings where online forum manipulation benefits consumers. Second, equilibria where strategies are monotonically increasing (decreasing) functions of a firm's true quality exist in settings where the firm's net payoff function, inclusive of the cost of manipulation, is supermodular (submodular) in the firm's quality and manipulation action. Third, in a broad class of settings, if the precision of honest consumer opinions that firms manipulate is sufficiently high, firms of all types, as well as society, would be strictly better off if manipulation of online forums was not possible. Nonetheless, firms are locked into a "rat race" and forced to spend resources on such profit-reducing activities; if they don't, consumer perceptions will be biased against them. The social cost of online manipulation can be reduced by developing "filtering" technologies that make it costlier for firms to manipulate. Interestingly, as the amount of user-contributed online content increases, it is firms, and not consumers, that have most to gain from the development of such technologies.
机译:越来越多的证据表明,消费者在做出各种购买决定之前会受到基于Internet的意见论坛的影响。因此,在此类论坛上讨论其产品的公司倾向于通过发布赞美其产品的昂贵匿名消息来操纵消费者的看法。本文提供了这种行为对企业利润和消费者剩余影响的理论分析。有三个主要结果。首先,如果每个公司的操纵策略都是该公司真实质量的单调增加(减少)功能,则对在线论坛的战略操纵会增加(减少)论坛对消费者的信息价值。该结果暗示存在在线论坛操纵使消费者受益的设置。第二,在公司的净收益函数(包括操纵成本)在公司的质量和操纵行为中是超模块化(亚模块化)的环境中,存在着策略使公司的真实质量的功能单调增加(减少)的均衡。第三,在广泛的情况下,如果公司操纵的诚实消费者意见的精确度足够高,那么如果无法操纵在线论坛,则所有类型的公司以及社会都将变得更好。但是,公司被困在“老鼠赛跑”中,被迫将资源用于这种减少利润的活动;如果他们不这样做,那么消费者的看法就会对他们产生偏见。通过开发“过滤”技术可以降低在线操纵的社会成本,这些技术使公司的操纵成本更高。有趣的是,随着用户提供的在线内容数量的增加,从此类技术的发展中受益最大的是公司而不是消费者。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号