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首页> 外文期刊>Georgetown Journal of International Law >WHO DO I CALL FOR AN EU SANCTIONS EXEMPTION?: WHY THE EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REGIME SHOULD CENTRALIZE LICENSING
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WHO DO I CALL FOR AN EU SANCTIONS EXEMPTION?: WHY THE EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REGIME SHOULD CENTRALIZE LICENSING

机译:我要向谁要求豁免欧盟制裁?:为什么欧盟经济制裁制度应集中许可

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摘要

The international response to violent government crackdowns against "Arab Spring" protestors, and to the Iranian nuclear crisis, featured the emergence of a new powerful player on the global economic sanctions scene - the European Union. Deviating from its stated policy, the European Union sanctioned autonomously and holistically in Libya, Syria, and Iran, imposing broad-based, categorical restrictions on doing business in those countries. These new measures suggest that the European Union increasingly will employ "holistic" sanctions to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the future. Given its relative nascence, however, concerns exist regarding the ability of the EU sanctions regime to manage the risks of holistic sanctions, which include the potential for conflicts of law, preclusion of legitimate trade, and collateral damage to ordinary citizens. The United States, a longtime proponent of holistic sanctions, manages these risks with the robust licensing practices of the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The European Union currently lacks a centralized licensing agency like OFAC and instead delegates licensing responsibilities to each of its twenty-seven "Member States." This Article explores the impact of the European Union's decentralized approach to licensing. The Article begins by chronicling the development of the EU sanctions regime through the successive European integration treaties. Following a review of modern EU sanctions policy and recent sanctions in the Middle East, the Article finds that divergence in foreign policy, administrative infrastructure, and resourcing among EU Member States can lead to inconsistent licensing practices and frustrated compliance efforts. The Article concludes that to ensure its effectiveness as a sanctioning body going forward, the EU must establish a centralized licensing infrastructure, like OFAC's, that achieve three "core competencies" essential to addressing the risks of holistic sanctions: flexibility, the ability to mitigate collateral damage, and adaptability.
机译:国际上对政府镇压“阿拉伯之春”示威者的镇压行动以及对伊朗核危机的国际反应,是在全球经济制裁领域出现了一个强大的新力量-欧盟。不同于其既定政策,欧洲联盟在利比亚,叙利亚和伊朗进行了自主和全面的制裁,对在这些国家开展业务施加了广泛的,绝对的限制。这些新措施表明,欧盟将来将越来越多地采用“整体”制裁以实现其外交政策目标。但是,鉴于其相对的天真性,人们对欧盟制裁制度管理整体制裁风险的能力存在担忧,这些风险包括潜在的法律冲突,排除合法贸易以及对普通公民的附带损害。美国长期以来一直是整体制裁的拥护者,通过财政部外国资产控制办公室(OFAC)强有力的许可做法来管理这些风险。欧盟目前缺乏像OFAC这样的集中许可机构,而是将许可责任委托给其27个“成员国”中的每一个。本文探讨了欧洲联盟分散管理许可方式的影响。该条首先通过历届欧洲一体化条约,记录了欧盟制裁制度的发展。在对现代欧盟制裁政策和最近在中东的制裁进行审查之后,该条认为,欧盟成员国之间外交政策,行政基础设施和资源配置的差异会导致不一致的许可做法和沮丧的合规工作。该条款的结论是,为了确保其作为制裁机构的有效性,欧盟必须建立像OFAC这样的集中式许可基础设施,该基础设施应实现应对整体制裁风险必不可少的三个“核心能力”:灵活性,减轻抵押品的能力。损坏和适应性。

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