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Allocating costs of a shared server with stochastic service parameters and job class priorities

机译:使用随机服务参数和作业类别优先级分配共享服务器的成本

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This paper develops an approach to allocate common costs to two divisions that share a process, where there is a trade-off between the joint investment in the process and the delays that a division's jobs are expected to experience there. We allow one division's jobs to have priority over the other division's jobs. One purpose of allocation is to obtain accuracy in costing of products reflecting their consumption of resources. The second purpose, the incentive issue, is to elicit truthful reports of private information possessed by each division on (i) delay cost parameters or (ii) expected usage, this information being needed for the investment decision. In case (i), we find that when a division's private information on its delay costs is poor or non-existent, it would prefer to invest at a weakly higher level than its accounting cost information justifies. In other words, a firm that allocates service center costs depending only on accounting measures of delay costs will under-invest in a shared facility. In case (ii), we find that to elicit truthful reporting by divisions requires a cost allocation rule that involves a complex monitoring of various physical parameters broadly related to the pattern of waiting times. This complexity is driven by the fact that one division has priority. However because actual usage provides an ex post estimate of expected usage up to some random error, a penalty scheme based on directly monitoring actual usage can be used to enforce truth telling up to any desired approximation. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:本文提出了一种方法,将共同成本分配给共享一个流程的两个部门,在该流程中的联合投资与预计该部门的工作在此遇到的延迟之间要进行权衡。我们允许一个部门的工作优先于另一部门的工作。分配的目的之一是获得反映其资源消耗的产品成本的准确性。第二个目的是激励问题,它是针对(i)延迟成本参数或(ii)预期使用情况得出各​​部门所拥有的私人信息的真实报告,该信息是投资决策所必需的。在情况(i)中,我们发现,当一个部门关于其延迟成本的私人信息不佳或不存在时,它宁愿以比其会计成本信息所能证明的微弱的更高水平进行投资。换句话说,仅根据延误成本的会计方法分配服务中心成本的公司将在共享设施上投资不足。在情况(ii)中,我们发现要按部门得出真实的报告,需要一项成本分配规则,该规则涉及对与等待时间模式广泛相关的各种物理参数的复杂监控。这种复杂性是由一个部门具有优先权这一事实驱动的。但是,由于实际使用情况会提供预期使用情况的事后估计值,直到某个随机误差,因此可以使用基于直接监视实际使用情况的惩罚方案来强制实施真相告知任何所需的近似值。 (c)2006 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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