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A controlled field experiment on corruption

机译:腐败的受控实地实验

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This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.
机译:本文报道了一项针对腐败的受控现场实验,旨在解决两个重要问题:实验者的审查和腐败的不可观察性。在实验中,向分级员提供贿赂以及对更好分级的要求。我们发现,定级者对更大的贿赂做出更有利的反应,而更高工资的影响却模棱两可:它降低了贿赂的接受度,但促进了往来。监视和惩罚可以阻止腐败,但我们不能拒绝,它也可能在加剧腐败时挤出诚实的内在动机。最后,我们的结果表明,腐败的几个微观决定因素包括年龄,能力,宗教信仰,但不包括性别。

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