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A routing defense mechanism using evolutionary game theory for Delay Tolerant Networks

机译:基于进化博弈论的时延容忍网络路由防御机制

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Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) often suffer from intermittent disruption due to factors such as mobility and energy. Though lots of routing algorithms in DTNs have been proposed in the last few years, the routing security problems have not attracted enough attention. DTNs are still facing the threats from different kinds of routing attacks. In this paper, a general purpose defense mechanism is proposed against various routing attacks on DTNs. The defense mechanism is based on the routing path information acquired from the forwarded messages and the acknowledgment (ACK), and it is suitable for different routing schemes. Evolutionary game theory is applied with the defense mechanism to analyze and facilitate the strategy changes of the nodes in the networks. Simulation results show that the proposed evolutionary game theory based defense scheme can achieve high average delivery ratio, low network overhead and low average transmission delay in various routing attack scenarios. By introducing the game theory, the networks can avoid being attacked and provide normal transmission service. The networks can reach evolutionary strategy stable (ESS) under special conditions after evolution. The initial parameters will affect the convergence speed and the final ESS, but the initial ratio of the nodes choosing different strategies can only affect the game process. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:延迟容忍网络(DTN)通常会由于诸如移动性和能量之类的因素而遭受间歇性中断。尽管最近几年已经提出了DTN中的许多路由算法,但是路由安全问题并未引起足够的重视。 DTN仍然面临着来自各种路由攻击的威胁。本文提出了一种针对DTN的各种路由攻击的通用防御机制。防御机制基于从转发消息和确认(ACK)获取的路由路径信息,适用于不同的路由方案。进化博弈论与防御机制相结合,分析并促进了网络中节点的策略变化。仿真结果表明,所提出的基于演化博弈论的防御方案在各种路由攻击场景下均可以实现较高的平均发送率,较低的网络开销和较低的平均传输时延。通过引入博弈论,网络可以避免受到攻击并提供正常的传输服务。网络在进化后可以在特殊条件下达到进化策略稳定(ESS)。初始参数将影响收敛速度和最终ESS,但是选择不同策略的节点的初始比率只会影响游戏过程。 (C)2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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