Real consequences of open market operations: The role of limited commitment

摘要

We study how limited commitment in credit markets affects the implementation of open market operations and characterize when they result in real indeterminacies and when they have real effects. To do so, we consider a frictional and incomplete market framework where agents face stochastic trading opportunities and limited commitment. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique stationary monetary equilibrium when limited commitment does not restrict agent's choices. However, real indeterminacies are possible when buyers face a binding no-default constraint. When the endogenous borrowing limit binds and bonds are not priced fundamentally, open market operations generically have real effects. A sale of government bonds can increase or decrease interest rates, depending on the nature of the equilibria. These phenomena are consistent with what is observed in the US. Moreover, when multiple equilibria exists welfare is larger at the steady state with a lower liquidity premium on government debt. Finally, government bond purchases can be used to rule out real indeterminacies, thus finding another rationale for such policy. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.