Subjectivity, Consciousness, and Pain: The Importance of Thinking Phenomenologically

摘要

Brain is a sine qua non for mind, but mind is not reducible to brain. In slightly different terms, the premise that con-sciousness does not float in the ether fails to license the conclusion that consciousness is equivalent to and nothing but brain. Searle maintains that this argument is "ludicrously simple" and "quite decisive" (Searle 1992), and yet there is excellent evidence that the claim is widely rejected in both neuroscience and neuroethics. As Amanda Pustilnik (2008) notes, many contemporary neuroscientists profess neuroreductionism or the idea that mind is nothing but neurophysiological substrate. It is in part because I believe such reductionism is mistaken that Gillett's (2009) latest contribution to neuroethics is so important.