False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad

摘要

Is it always wise to disclose good news? Using a new statistical dominance condition, we show that if the receiver has any private receiver information then the weakest senders with good news gain the most from boasting about it. Hence the act of disclosing good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. Nondisclosure by some or all senders is an equilibrium if standards for the news are sufficiently easy or if prior expectations without the news are sufficiently favorable. Full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if standards are sufficiently difficult or sufficiently fine, or if prior expectations are sufficiently unfavorable. Since the sender has a legitimate fear of looking overly anxious to reveal good news, mandating that the sender disclose the news can help the sender. The model's predictions are consistent with when faculty avoid using titles such as "Dr." or "Professor" in voicemail greetings and course syllabi. Published by Elsevier B.V.