A Moral/Pragmatic Defense of Just Deserts Responsibility

摘要

We do not know whether human beings have the kind of free will which is the basis of moral responsibility in the just deserts sense. It remains an open question whether or not we have this kind of free will. This presents us with a kind of dilemma regarding how we should respond to those who engage in wrongdoing and who violate laws. Should we abstain from blaming and punishing them for their wrongdoing, since we do not know whether they have the kind of free will which is necessary to make them responsible in a way which could justify such harsh treatment? Or should we go ahead and regard people as morally responsible in the just deserts sense and engage in blame and punishment despite our lack of knowledge regarding the existence of desert grounding free will? In what follows, I will argue that even though we lack sufficient empirical, logical, or metaphysical evidence for the existence of free will and the just deserts responsibility it supports, there are nonetheless good moral reasons for us to uphold belief in such free will and to live and act as if we have it.