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Effects of marketing contracts and resource-providing contracts in the African small farm sector: Insights from oil palm production in Ghana

机译:营销合同与资源提供合同在非洲小农场部门的影响:加纳油棕榈生产见解

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摘要

Smallholder farmers in developing countries often suffer from high risk and limited market access. Contract farming may improve the situation under certain conditions. Several studies analyzed effects of contracts on smallholder productivity and income with mixed results. Most existing studies focused on one particular contract scheme. Contract characteristics rarely differ within one scheme, so little is known about how different contract characteristics may influence the benefits for smallholders. Here, we address this research gap using data from oil palm farmers in Ghana who participate in different contract schemes. Some of the farmers have simple marketing contracts, while others have resource-providing contracts where the buyer also offers inputs and technical services on credit. A comparison group cultivates oil palm without any contract. Regression models that control for selection bias show that resource-providing contracts increase farmers' input use and yield. Resource-providing contracts also incentivize higher levels of specialization and an increase in the scale of production. These effects are especially pronounced for small and medium-sized farms. In contrast, the marketing contracts have no significant effects on input use, productivity, and scale of production. The results suggest that resource-providing contracts alleviate market access constraints, while simple marketing contracts do not in this context. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
机译:发展中国家的小农农民经常遭受高风险和有限的市场准入。合同耕作可能会在某些条件下改善局势。几项研究分析了合同对小型生产力和收入的影响。大多数现有研究都集中在一个特定的合同计划上。合同特征在一个方案中很少有所不同,所以关于不同的合同特征如何影响小农的益处。在这里,我们使用来自加纳的石油棕榈养殖者的数据来解决这一研究差距,他参加了不同的合同计划。一些农民有简单的营销合同,而其他农民则提供资源提供的合同,买方还提供信用的投入和技术服务。比较群体培养油棕,没有任何合同。控制选择偏差的回归模型显示资源提供的合同增加农民的投入使用和产量。提供资源合同也会激励更高水平的专业化和生产规模的增加。这些效果对中型农场特别明显。相比之下,营销合同对投入使用,生产力和生产规模没有显着影响。结果表明,提供资源合同减轻了市场准入制度,而简单的营销合同不在这种情况下。 (c)2020作者。 elsevier有限公司出版

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