Why Authenticity May Be an Inherent Bioethical DBS Concern

摘要

In their article, Johansson and colleagues (2014) propose to make a distinction between two types of bioethical concerns related to deep brain stimulation (DBS). First are inherent concerns, related to the DBS technology per se, which are "concerns that address the defining features of the technology itself" (Johansson et al. 2014, 27) The scope of such concerns is limited, because they only regard "the main defining features of DBS [which] are (a) an electronic device (b) chronically implanted in the brain (c) stimulating the brain to alter brain function." Johansson and colleague argue that many of the present concerns about DBS fall outside of this "inherent" concern definition. In fact, according to their proposal, only some technical, spatial, temporal aspects of DBS (like being located in the brain) are related to inherent bioethical concerns. The rest of the DBS effects, which have had such an impact on the bioethical debate, are, apparently, no more than side effects that are likely to disappear over time, and therefore noninherent bioethical DBS concerns.