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首页> 外文期刊>Health services research: HSR >The effects of plan payment rates on the market for Medicare Advantage Dual‐Eligible Special Needs Plans
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The effects of plan payment rates on the market for Medicare Advantage Dual‐Eligible Special Needs Plans

机译:计划支付率对Medicare Advantage的市场的影响双重资格的特殊需求计划

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Abstract Objective To determine the effect of higher potential benchmark payment rates on the market for Medicare Advantage ( MA ) Dual‐Eligible Special Needs Plans (D‐ SNP s). Data Sources/Study Setting Publicly available county‐level data from 2009 to 2015 regarding the number of D‐ SNP s operating within the county, the enrollment in and five‐star quality of score of these plans, and the benchmark amounts used to determine capitated plan payments. Study Design This study exploits the introduction of quality bonus payments to the MA program in 2012, and exogenous geographic variation in the potential size of these bonuses to estimate the effect of benchmark payment increases on the availability, quality, and take‐up of D‐ SNP s. We use a difference‐in‐difference estimation approach to compare changes in the market for D‐ SNP s in counties eligible for a double bonus to those that are not. Principal Findings The doubling of bonuses was associated with a relative 29 percent increase in the number of D‐ SNP s offered ( P? = ? 0.021) and 0.1‐star increase in the average quality of available D‐ SNP s ( P? = ? 0.034). No relative increase in overall D‐ SNP enrollment was detected. Conclusions These findings indicate that larger benchmark payment amounts may influence insurers’ decisions of whether to participate in the D‐ SNP market but not dual‐eligibles' decision of whether to enroll in these plans. Future research is needed to inform discussions about whether D‐ SNP s are a viable mechanism for integrating benefits for dual eligibles and the degree to which Medicare policies should support their continued growth.
机译:摘要目的确定高潜在的基准支付率对Medicare Advantage市场(MA)双符合资格的特殊需求计划(D-SNP S)的影响。数据来源/研究从2009年到2015年的公开可用的县级数据,了解县内的D-SNP S的数量,这些计划的入学和五星级的分数质量,以及用于确定所得的基准金额计划付款。研究设计本研究利用2012年对MA计划引入质量奖金,以及这些奖金的潜在规模的外源地理变化来估计基准支付的效果增加了D-的可用性,质量和卷取SNP S.我们使用差异差分估计方法来比较市场中的县的变化,符合副资格对那些没有的双重奖金。主要结果奖金的加倍与所提供的D-SNP S的数量增加29%(p?= 0.021)和0.1星的可用D-SNP S的平均质量增加(P?=? 0.034)。未检测到整体D-SNP注册的相对增加。结论这些调查结果表明,较大的基准支付金额可能影响保险公司的决定是否参与D-SNP市场,但不是双重eligibers的决定是否注册这些计划。需要进行未来的研究,以便于讨论D-SNP S是否是用于整合双重eligies的益处的可行机制以及医疗保险政策应该支持其持续增长的程度。

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