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首页> 外文期刊>The Quarterly Journal of Economics >OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN OUTSOURCING TO CHINA: ESTIMATING THE PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY OF THE FIRM
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OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN OUTSOURCING TO CHINA: ESTIMATING THE PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY OF THE FIRM

机译:外包外包的所有权与控制:估算公司的产权理论

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摘要

We develop a simple model of international outsourcing and apply it to processing trade in China. Export processing involves a foreign firm contracting with a Chinese factory manager to assemble intermediate inputs into a final product. Whether the same or different parties should have ownership of the processing factory and control over input purchases depends on parameters of the model, which we estimate. We find that multinational firms engaged in export processing in China tend to split factory ownership and input control with local managers: the most common outcome is to have foreign factory ownership but Chinese control over input purchases. Consistent with our model, this pattern is especially prevalent in the southern coastal provinces, where export markets are thickest and contracting costs are lowest.
机译:我们开发了一个简单的国际外包模式,并将其应用于中国的加工贸易。 出口加工涉及与中国工厂经理的外国公司签约,将中间输入组合成最终产品。 相同或不同的各方是否应该拥有处理工厂的所有权并控制输入购买取决于我们估计的模型的参数。 我们发现,从事中国出口加工的跨国公司倾向于将工厂所有权和投入控制与当地经理分开:最常见的结果是外国工厂所有权,而是对输入购买进行控制。 与我们的模型一致,这种模式在南部沿海省份特别普遍,出口市场是最厚的,承包成本最低。

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