Varieties of recollective experience

摘要

Four variants on Tulving's "Remember/Know" paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing (similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognitionby-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Experiments 1-3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1-3), and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by "feeling", but rarely by "knowing"; d' is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1-4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural substrates of memory retrieval.