Comment on 'Cryptanalysis and improvement of multiparty semiquantum secret sharing based on rearranging orders of qubits'

摘要

Recently, Yin and Fu(1) pointed out that Gao et al.'s multiparty semiquantum secret sharing scheme(2) is vulnerable to their proposing attack strategy (hereafter called the YF attack). However, in this paper, we comment that the YF attack fails to attack Gao et al.'s scheme. Next, let us give a brief description of the YF attack which is implemented by the two dishonest agents, Bob(m-i) and Bob(m-1) which is as follows: Step 1. After receiving t sequence,(3,4) Bob(m-i) selects (5 qubits in each group and tells Bob(m), the positions of selected qubits and the rearranging orders(5) of qubit t. Step 2. After Bob?, receives t sequence from Bob,n_i, he rearranges orders of qubit t in each group and uses the Z basis to measure it. Next, Bob(m), prepares fresh qubits in the same states that he obtained after measuring, and inserts the prepared fresh qubits into the positions of measured qubits. Obviously, the fresh qubits form a fake t sequence and Bob(m), entirely knows the states of qubits in the fake t sequence. Then he sends the fake t sequence to Alice. Step 3. After receiving the sequence, Alice picks out K groups in N groups to check eavesdropping. She requires Bob(1), Bob(2),, Bob(m), to publish the rearranged orders of qubit tin each K group and qubit t is measured. When Bob(m), publishes the measured qubits t,