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Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self-funded patent offices

机译:专利审查员,隐性合同和自助专利办事处的主观表现

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摘要

Self-funded patent offices should be concerned with patent quality (patents should be granted to only deserving innovations) and quantity (as revenues come from fees paid by applicants). In this context, we investigate what is the impact of the self-funded constraint on different bonus contracts and how these contracts affect the examiners' incentive to prosecute patent applications. We consider contracts in which a patent office offers bonuses on quantity quotas (explicit contract) and on quality outcome (either an implicit contract or an explicit contract based on a quality proxy). We find that a self-funded constrained agency should make different organization choices of incentives. For a low quality proxy precision, an agency facing a tight budget operates well with implicit contracts. However, by only relaxing moderately the budget constraint, the agency might be worse off simply because this will preclude implicit contracts. Only very large patenting fees might allow the agency to compensate for the loss of implicit contracts.
机译:自筹资金专利局应关注专利质量(专利仅授予应得的创新)和数量(因为收入来自申请人支付的费用)。在这种情况下,我们调查自筹资约制对不同奖励合同的影响以及这些合同如何影响审查员对起诉专利申请的激励。我们考虑了专利局提供数量配额(明确合同)和质量结果(基于质量代理的明确合同)的合同。我们发现一个自筹资约组织的机构应制定不同的组织奖励的选择。对于低质量的代理精度,面临紧张预算的机构与隐性合同良好运行。然而,仅仅通过中等放松的预算限制,原子能机构可能会更糟糕的只是因为这将排除隐性合同。只有非常大的专利费用可能允许原子能机构赔偿损失隐性合同。

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