On the Nash equilibria for the FCFS queueing system with load-increasing service rate

摘要

We consider a service system (Qs) that operates according to the first-come-first-served (FCFS) discipline, and in which the service rate is an increasing function of the queue length. Customers arrive sequentially at the system, and decide whether or not to join using decision rules based upon the queue length on arrival. Each customer is interested in selecting a rule that meets a certain optimality criterion with regard to their expected sojourn time in the system; as a consequence, the decision rules of other customers must be taken into account. Within a particular class of decision rules for an associated infinite-player game, the structure of the Nash equilibrium routeing policies is characterized. We prove that, within this class, there exist a finite number of Nash equilibria, and that at least one-of these is nonrandomized. Finally, with the aid of simulation experiments, we explore the extent to which the Nash equilibria are-characteristic of customer joining behaviour under a learning rule based on system-wide data.