Narrative Identity: Challenges for Retribution in the Criminal Justice System

摘要

Jecker and Ko (2017) advocate a twofold concept of identity for understanding the persistence of persons. The authors make the distinction between numerical identity— the mere persistence of the organism—and narrative identity— the characteristics and experiences that make up the distinct autobiography of an individual. Through their discussion, Jecker and Ko highlight how neurological interventions can be successful, in that the patient lives, but could change the individual to such an extent that he or she ceases to exist. We appreciate the authors’ contribution and find utility in their robust concept of identity. The needs of individuals who develop severe diseases and disorders or who undergo radical treatment to alleviate symptoms of these conditions may be overlooked without a nuanced concept of identity. The authors’ concept of identity is useful to assuring that patients receive adequate follow-up care and mental health treatment to adjust to new circumstances. Jecker and Ko’s concept of identity, however, poses interesting dilemmas for the criminal justice system in the United States. In this commentary, we focus on the difficulties for retributivism—the dominant aim of the American criminal justice system for the past four decades (Slobogin 2016)—implicated by the author’s concept of identity. We do not, however, make normative judgments about the solutions to the issues and questions raised by the authors’ concept of identity.