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首页> 外文期刊>Culture, medicine and psychiatry >The (un)managed self: paradoxical forms of agency in self-management of bipolar disorder.
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The (un)managed self: paradoxical forms of agency in self-management of bipolar disorder.

机译:(非)自我管理:躁郁症自我管理中代理的悖论形式。

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摘要

Self-management of mental illness is a therapeutic paradigm that draws on a distinctly biomedical conceptualization of the isolability of personhood from pathology. This discourse posits a stable and rational patient/consumer who can observe, anticipate, and preside over his disease through a set of learned practices. But in the case of bipolar disorder, where the rationality of the patient is called into question, the managing self is elusive, and the disease that is managed coincides with the self. While humanist critiques of the biomedical model as applied to mental illness have argued that its logic fatalistically denies patients intentionality and effectiveness (Luhrmann, Of Two Minds: The Growing Disorder in American Psychiatry, 2000), biomedical proponents claim that psychiatry's way of envisioning the body as under the control of the intentional mind actually returns agency to the patient/consumer. Rose (The Psychiatric Gaze, 1999) remarks that biomedical models have the potential to [open] that which was considered natural to a form of choice techniques of medical self-control help constitute the free embodied liberal subject who is obliged to calculate and choose. Through an examination of clinical literature as well as the practices and narratives of members of a bipolar support group, this paper explores ethnographically the possibilities for subjectivity and agency that are conditioned or foreclosed by the self-management paradigm, which seems to simultaneously confer and deny rational selfhood to bipolar patients. To express their expertise as rational self-managers, patients/consumers must, paradoxically, articulate constant suspicion toward their present thoughts and emotions, and distrust of an imagined future self. I argue that through their self-management practices, bipolar support group members model provisional and distributed forms of agency based on an elusive, discontinuous, and only partially knowable or controllable self-revealing, perhaps, the limits of the contemporary reification and medicalization of both selfhood and disease.
机译:精神疾病的自我管理是一种治疗范式,它借鉴了人格与病理学可分离性的独特生物医学概念。该论述提出了一个稳定而理性的患者/消费者,他们可以通过一系列习得的实践来观察,预测和主持其疾病。但是在双相情感障碍的情况下,患者的合理性受到质疑,自我管理是难以捉摸的,所管理的疾病与自我相吻合。人文主义对生物医学模型应用于精神疾病的批评认为,它的逻辑在宿命论上否认了患者的意图和有效性(Luhrmann,《两种思想:美国精神病学的日益严重的混​​乱》,2000年),而生物医学的支持者则声称精神病学对身体的设想方式因为在意向心智的控制下,代理实际上将代理权还给了患者/消费者。 Rose(Psychiatric Gaze,1999)指出,生物医学模型有可能[打开]某种形式的医学自控帮助技术自然而然地构成的自由构成的自由主体,该主体有义务进行计算和选择。通过对临床文献以及双极支持小组成员的实践和叙述的研究,本文从人种学角度探讨了由自我管理范式限制或取消的主观性和代理性的可能性,自我管理范式似乎同时给予和否认躁郁症患者的合理性。为了表达他们作为理性自我管理者的专业知识,患者/消费者必须自相矛盾地对他们当前的思想和情感表达出不断的怀疑,并且不信任想象中的未来自我。我认为,两极支持小组成员通过他们的自我管理实践,以一种难以捉摸,不连续且仅部分可知或可控制的自我揭示为基础,对临时和分散形式的代理机构进行建模,这也许是两者的现代化和医学化的局限性自私与疾病。

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