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A Game Theorem-Based Approach to Avoid Malicious Nodes in Mobile Ad hoc Networks

机译:基于博弈论的移动自组织网络中避免恶意节点的方法

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摘要

In ubiquitous context of mobile ad hoc networks, all network functions must be performed by the nodes themselves. Whereas the bandwidth allocated per node decreases with the number of nodes increase, some nodes may be interested in higher bandwidth, in this case, they may intend not to relay packets for other nodes. If most nodes find it benefit for themselves, their sequacious actions may break down the whole network. We address this as malicious nodes problem. In this paper, our approach is based on game theory with noncooperation, i.e., there are conflicts for which the rules of a game do not specify any agreement or cooperation. We establish a simple malicious node game that models the bandwidth payoffs for the network and the nodes, define contribution rate (CR) and attack rate (AR) for the two strategies of each node, and then we show Nash equilibria exist in all-node strategy set Finally we propose an algorithm that converges to a Nash equilibrium.
机译:在移动自组织网络无处不在的情况下,所有网络功能必须由节点自己执行。尽管为每个节点分配的带宽随节点数量的增加而减少,但是某些节点可能会对更高的带宽感兴趣,在这种情况下,它们可能不打算为其他节点中继数据包。如果大多数节点发现它对自己有利,那么他们的过时行为可能会破坏整个网络。我们将此视为恶意节点问题。在本文中,我们的方法基于不合作的博弈论,即存在一些博弈规则未指定任何协议或合作的冲突。我们建立了一个简单的恶意节点游戏,该模型为网络和节点的带宽收益建模,为每个节点的两种策略定义贡献率(CR)和攻击率(AR),然后我们证明了全节点中存在纳什均衡策略集最后,我们提出一种收敛到纳什均衡的算法。

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