A modified no-fault malpractice system can resolve multiple healthcare system deficiencies.

摘要

Medical professional liability in the United States, as measured by total premiums paid by physicians and healthcare facilities, costs approximately Dollars 30 billion a year in direct expenses, less than 2% of the entire annual healthcare expenditures. Only a fraction of those dollars reach patients who are negligently injured. Nonetheless, the tort system has far-reaching effects that create substantial indirect costs. Medical malpractice litigation is pervasive and physicians practice defensively to avoid being named in a suit. Those extra expenditures provide little value to patients. Despite an elaborate existing tort system, patient safety remains a vexing problem. Many injured patients are denied access to timely, reasonable remedies. We propose a no-fault system supplemented by a variation of the traditional tort system whereby physicians are incentivized to follow evidence-based guidelines. The proposed system would guarantee a substantial decrease in, but not elimination of, litigation. The system would lower professional liability premiums. Injured patients would ordinarily be compensated with no-fault disability and life insurance proceeds. To the extent individual physicians pose a recurrent danger, their care would be reviewed on an administrative level. Savings would be invested in health information technology and purchase of insurance coverage for the uninsured. We propose a financial model based on publicly accessible sources.