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A Fuzzy Approach to Strategic Games Using Fuzzy Expected Value Models

机译:基于模糊期望值模型的战略博弈模糊方法

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摘要

A game is a decision-making situation with many players, having objectives that partly or completely conflict with each other. The players involved in the game usually make their decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply fuzzy approaches to the field of game theory. Recently, a static fuzzy approach to strategic games was proposed by Song and Kandel [1]. It is found that the computation of optimal strategies is a difficult task using this approach. Expected value of a fuzzy variable introduced by B. Liu and K. Liu [18] is a novel idea with properties that simplify general decision-making in a fuzzy environment. In this paper the fuzzy approach to strategic games is remodeled using fuzzy expected value models. Using this method, it is shown that more meaningful conclusions regarding the selection of optimal strategies are possible for the famous "prisoner's dilemma" problem.
机译:游戏是许多玩家的决策情况,其目标部分或完全相互冲突。参与游戏的玩家通常会在风险或不确定性条件下做出决定。因此,将模糊方法应用于博弈论领域是适当的。最近,Song和Kandel [1]提出了一种用于战略博弈的静态模糊方法。发现使用这种方法来计算最优策略是一项艰巨的任务。 B. Liu和K. Liu [18]引入的模糊变量的期望值是一种新颖的思想,其特性可以简化模糊环境中的一般决策。本文采用模糊期望值模型对战略博弈的模糊方法进行了重构。使用这种方法,可以证明对于著名的“囚徒困境”问题,关于最佳策略选择的更有意义的结论是可能的。

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