首页> 外文期刊>Journal of comparative effectiveness research >Paying the doctor: evidence-based decisions at the point-of-care and the role of fee-for-service incentives
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Paying the doctor: evidence-based decisions at the point-of-care and the role of fee-for-service incentives

机译:支付医生费用:基于即时决策的服务点以及收费服务激励措施的作用

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摘要

This article develops a framework for understanding how financial and nonfinancial incentives can complicate point-of-care decision-making by physicians, leading to the overuse or underuse of healthcare services. By examining the types of decisions that clinicians and patients make at the point-of-care, the framework clarifies how incentives can distort physicians' decisions about testing, diagnosis and treatment, as well as efforts to enhance patient adherence. The analysis highlights contributing factors that promote and impede evidence-based decision-making, using examples from the 'Choosing Wisely' program. It concludes with a summary of how the existing fee-for-service payment system in the USA may contribute to the problems of over- and under-testing, diagnosis and treatment, highlighted through the efforts of Choosing Wisely.
机译:本文建立了一个框架,用于了解财务和非财务激励措施如何使医师对医疗点的决策复杂化,从而导致医疗服务的过度使用或使用不足。通过检查临床医生和患者在现场进行的决定的类型,该框架阐明了激励措施如何扭曲医师在测试,诊断和治疗以及增强患者依从性方面的决定。该分析使用“明智选择”程序中的示例突出了促进和阻碍基于证据的决策的因素。最后总结了美国现有的按服务付费系统可能如何导致过度测试和测试不足,诊断和治疗的问题,通过“明智选择”的努力突显了这一点。

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