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Some unorthodox thoughts on China's unorthodox financial sector

机译:关于中国非正统金融部门的一些非正统思想

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China's banks are undeniably in serious financial straits. Citigroup (2002) has estimated that the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) at the four biggest state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) to be about 35 percent at the beginning of 2002, and that the average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of these four SOCBs to be 5 percent. In short, the bank recapitalization in late 1998, which had raised CAR to over 8 percent, was a wasted effort. The primary reasons for this rapid deterioration in the financial health of the banks are that the composition of the customer base has not changed, so that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain the biggest borrowers, and that there has been intermittent pressure on the banks since 1997 from the government to expand investment credit in order to combat deflation, and to expand social stability loans to reduce firm closures. The result is that the SOCBs are now in need of another round of recapitalization. In this situation of a fragile banking system, China has committed itself to opening up the banking system completely within 5 years of WTO accession (which it joined in December 2001). Foreign banks could conduct transactions in foreign currencies from the beginning of WTO membership, conduct transactions with the local corporate sector in Renminbi after 2 years, and conduct transactions with local households in local currencies after 5 years. Although foreign banks are likely to compete only in the coastal cities, at least in the initial period, the pressure on domestic banks could be high as the big four banks earn almost all of their profits from about the coastal cities. Because there is no explicit depositor insurance in China, the obvious question is whether depositors will believe that thee foreign banks will drive the SOCBs into open bankruptcy, and hence rush to withdraw their savings from the SOCBs, setting in motion the vicious downward spiral of credit contraction, leading to business failures, rendering sound financial institutions insolvent, and contracting credit further.
机译:不可否认,中国的银行处于严重的金融困境。花旗集团(Citigroup,2002)估计,到2002年初,四家最大的国有商业银行(SOCBs)的不良贷款比率约为35%,而这些银行的平均资本充足率(CAR)四个SOCB为5%。简而言之,1998年末的银行资本重组将资本充足率提高到8%以上,是一种浪费。银行财务状况迅速恶化的主要原因是客户基础的组成没有改变,国有企业仍然是最大的借款者,并且银行承受了间歇性的压力。自1997年以来,政府开始扩大投资信贷以应对通货紧缩,并扩大社会稳定贷款以减少企业倒闭。结果是,SOCB现在需要另一轮注资。在银行体系脆弱的情况下,中国承诺在加入世贸组织(2001年12月加入)的5年内完全开放银行体系。从加入世贸组织开始,外国银行可以进行外币交易,两年后可以与人民币当地公司部门进行交易,五年后可以与本地居民以当地货币进行交易。尽管外国银行可能仅在沿海城市竞争,至少在初期,但由于四大银行几乎从沿海城市获得的全部利润,对国内银行的压力可能很高。因为中国没有明确的存款人保险,所以显而易见的问题是,存款人是否会认为外资银行会促使国有商业银行陷入公开破产,从而争先恐后地从国有商业银行提取存款,从而引发信贷恶性循环下降收缩,导致业务失败,使健全的金融机构资不抵债,并进一步收缩信贷。

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