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首页> 外文期刊>WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics >Study on the dynamic model of a duopoly game with delay in insurance market
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Study on the dynamic model of a duopoly game with delay in insurance market

机译:具有保险市场延迟的双头垄断博弈的动力学模型研究。

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摘要

On the basis of domestic and foreign workers' study, this paper considers the dynamic model of a duopoly price game in insurance market. In the duopoly model, we theoretically analyze the existence and stability of the Nash equilibrium point of the dynamic system, when one player or both players make a delayed decision, then stability conditions are obtained. The numerical simulation results further confirmed the accuracy of the theory. We observe that consideration of the delayed decision cannot change the equilibrium point of the system, but the time to the situation of stabilize will be changed because of the influence of the delayed variable and other parameters. If we increase the value of delayed parameter, the system will take longer time to be stable. If we change the speed of price adjustment and the weight of price of different periods, the time to the situation of stabilize will be changed.
机译:在国内外工人研究的基础上,研究了保险市场上双头垄断价格博弈的动力学模型。在双寡头模型中,我们从理论上分析了动力系统纳什均衡点的存在和稳定性,当一个参与者或两个参与者做出延迟决策时,便获得了稳定条件。数值模拟结果进一步证实了该理论的准确性。我们观察到,延迟决策的考虑不能改变系统的平衡点,但是由于延迟变量和其他参数的影响,达到稳定状态的时间将改变。如果增加延迟参数的值,系统将需要更长的时间才能稳定下来。如果我们改变价格调整的速度和不同时期的价格权重,那么到稳定状态的时间就会改变。

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