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Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

机译:事实改变时改变思想:专家的激励和报告协议的设计

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摘要

Experts often collect and report information over time. What reporting protocol elicits the most information? Here, a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability, who observes two signals about the state of the world. The signals differ in initial quality and, unlike previous work, differ in quality improvement. The paper finds that "mind changes" (inconsistent reports) can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster. Also, sequential reports dominate when the principal's decision is very sensitive to information; a single report dominates if the mediocre agent's signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre.
机译:专家经常收集和报告信息。哪种报告协议可以获取最多的信息?在这里,委托人从具有私人已知能力的代理顺序接收报告,该代理观察到有关世界状况的两个信号。信号的初始质量不同,并且与以前的工作不同,信号的质量改进也不同。该论文发现,如果智能代理的改进速度更快,“思想改变”(不一致的报告)可以向人才发出信号。同样,当委托人的决定对信息非常敏感时,顺序报告将占主导。如果中庸座席的信号改善得更快,或者该座席很可能是中庸的,则以单个报告为主。

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