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首页> 外文期刊>The European physical journal, D. Atomic, molecular, and optical physics >On the optimality of individual entangling-probe attacks against BB84 quantum key distribution
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On the optimality of individual entangling-probe attacks against BB84 quantum key distribution

机译:关于BB84量子密钥分配的纠缠探针攻击的最优性

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Some MIT researchers [Phys. Rev. A 75, 042327 (2007)] have recently claimed that their implementation of the Slutsky-Brandt attack [Phys. Rev. A 57, 2383 (1998); Phys. Rev. A 71, 042312 (2005)] to the BB84 quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol puts the security of this protocol "to the test" by simulating "the most powerful individual-photon attack" [Phys. Rev. A 73, 012315 (2006)]. A related unfortunate news feature by a scientific journal [G. Brumfiel, Quantum cryptography is hacked, News @ Nature (april 2007); Nature 447, 372 (2007)] has spurred some concern in the QKD community and among the general public by misinterpreting the implications of this work. The present article proves the existence of a stronger individual attack on QKD protocols with encrypted error correction, for which tight bounds are shown, and clarifies why the claims of the news feature incorrectly suggest a contradiction with the established "old-style" theory of BB84 individual attacks. The full implementation of a quantum cryptographic protocol includes a reconciliation and a privacy-amplification stage, whose choice alters in general both the maximum extractable secret and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The authors of [Phys. Rev. A 75, 042327 (2007)] are concerned only with the error-free part of the so-called sifted string, and do not consider faulty bits, which, in the version of their protocol, are discarded. When using the provably superior reconciliation approach of encrypted error correction (instead of error discard), the Slutsky-Brandt attack is no more optimal and does not "threaten" the security bound derived by Lutkenhaus [Phys. Rev. A 59, 3301 (1999)]. It is shown that the method of Slutsky and collaborators [Phys. Rev. A 57, 2383 (1998)] can be adapted to reconciliation with error correction, and that the optimal entangling probe can be explicitly found. Moreover, this attack fills Lutkenhaus bound, proving that it is tight (a fact which was not previously known).
机译:麻省理工学院的一些研究人员[Phys。 A. 75,042327(2007)Rev.最近宣称他们实施了Slutsky-Brandt攻击[Phys。 A 57,2383(1998);物理BB84量子密钥分配(QKD)协议的修订版A 71,042312(2005)]通过模拟“最强大的单个光子攻击” [Phys。 Rev.A 73,012315(2006)]。科学期刊的相关不幸新闻报道[G. Brumfiel,《量子密码学被黑客入侵》,News @ Nature(2007年4月); Nature 447,372(2007)]误解了这项工作的含义,引起了QKD社区和广大公众的关注。本文通过加密纠错证明了对QKD协议的更强的个人攻击的存在,并显示了严格的界限,并阐明了新闻特征的声明为何错误地暗示了与已建立的BB84“旧式”理论的矛盾个人攻击。量子密码协议的完整实现包括和解和隐私放大阶段,其选择通常会改变最大可提取秘密和最佳窃听攻击。 [Phys。 Rev. A 75,042327(2007)]仅涉及所谓的筛选字符串的无错误部分,并且不考虑错误比特,在其协议的版本中,该错误比特被丢弃。当使用可证明的高级纠错方法(而不是错误丢弃)进行加密的纠错时,Slutsky-Brandt攻击不再是最优的,并且不会“威胁” Lutkenhaus得出的安全界限。 Rev.A 59,3301(1999)]。结果表明,Slutsky和合作者的方法[Phys。 Rev. A 57,2383(1998)]可适用于通过纠错进行和解,并且可以明确找到最佳纠缠探针。此外,这种攻击使Lutkenhaus陷入困境,证明它是紧密的(这一事实以前未知)。

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