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Dynamic competition in pharmaceuticals: Patent expiry, generic penetration, and industry structure

机译:药品的动态竞争:专利到期,仿制渗透和行业结构

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摘要

This paper investigates patterns of industrial dynamics and competition in the pharmaceutical industry, with particular reference to the consequences of patent expiry in different countries. We focus on the competition at the level of single chemical entities, distinguishing between original brands and generic products. Quarterly data, spanning from July 1987 to December 1998, on sales of pharmaceutical products in four countries (USA, UK, Germany, and France) constitute the basis of our analysis. All the products containing major molecules whose patent expiration date lies between 1986 and 1996 are included in our sample. We show how diffusion of generics is linked to the characteristics of the market and investigate how price dynamics of original products are affected by generic competition. Our empirical investigation shows that the dynamics of drug prices and the competition by generic drugs vary significantly across countries. This heterogeneity notwithstanding, a clear distinction seems to emerge. On the one hand, systems that rely on market-based competition in pharmaceuticals promote a clear distinction between firms that act as innovators and firms that act as imitators after patent expiry. Here, original products enjoy premium prices and exclusivity profits under patent protection, and face fierce price competition after patent expiry. On the other hand, in systems that rely on administered prices, penetration by generic drugs tends to be rather limited. Its descriptive and preliminary nature notwithstanding, our analysis seems to have relevant implications at different levels of generality, especially for Europe.
机译:本文研究了制药行业的产业动态和竞争模式,尤其是在不同国家专利到期的后果方面。我们专注于单一化学实体一级的竞争,区分原始品牌和通用产品。从1987年7月至1998年12月的四个数据(美国,英国,德国和法国)的季度销售数据构成了我们的分析基础。我们的样本中包括所有包含主要分子的专利到期日期在1986年至1996年之间的产品。我们展示了仿制药的扩散如何与市场特征相关联,并研究了仿制药竞争如何影响原始产品的价格动态。我们的实证研究表明,不同国家的药品价格动态和非专利药品的竞争差异很大。尽管存在这种异质性,但似乎出现了明显的区别。一方面,依靠药品基于市场竞争的系统促进了专利到期后作为创新者的公司与作为模仿者的公司之间的明显区别。在这里,原始产品在专利保护下享有溢价和专有利润,并且在专利到期后面临激烈的价格竞争。另一方面,在依赖管理价格的系统中,仿制药的渗透率往往受到限制。尽管具有描述性和初步性,但我们的分析似乎在不同的普遍性水平上具有相关的含义,尤其是对于欧洲。

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