Among the various reform proposals surveyed in the preceding section, we think three would produce sufficient change to serve as an effective centrepiece for a comprehensive overhaul of the IMF's regime of quotas, votes and representation: increasing basic votes to a set percentage; a switch to a PPP-based version of GDP; and/or adoption of a double majority voting system. We favour some form of a count and account decision rule, primarily because it would simplify or eliminate other arbitrary and problematic aspects of this regime. In addition to neatly reconciling two contradictory principles, a double majority system makes basic votes dispensable; can be compatible with consensual decision processes if used only in cases of dissensus; and would be consistent with a rationalised schedule of special majorities. Count and account is also fully compatible with other needed reforms: leadership selection, personnel, EB reform and the assignment problem. Change from the existing weighted voting regime to a double majority decision rule would require amendment of the Fund's AA, no doubt a formidable political obstacle as it would require approval, ironically, by a double majority. This poses a seemingly insurmountable obstacle since it would be subject to veto by the US, which opposes every reform discussed. Nonetheless, comprehensive reform is necessary to restore the legitimacy and effectiveness of this critical institution.
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