Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition

摘要

One of the most discussed issues in psychologypresently and in the pastis how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoningdeductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choiceperform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive (is) and the normative (ought) in psychology and philosophy.Schurz and Hertwig address the perennial issue of defining and measuring the rationality of human cognition. After reviewing recent developments in ecological rationality and descriptivisim, they call for psychologists and philosophers to work towards defining rational cognition in terms of ``cognitive success.