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Give Me Back My Money: A Proposed Amendment to Delaware's Prepayment System in Statutory Appraisal Cases

机译:退还我的钱:法定评估案件中特拉华州预付款系统的拟议修正

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摘要

In 2016, the Delaware General Assembly amended section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to provide surviving corporations with the option to prepay stockholders in appraisal cases. Specifically, the amendment gives a surviving corporation the option to pay, in advance of a trial, to determine the stock's fair value, whatever amount per share that it chooses. Doing so cuts off the statutory interest on the prepaid amount, which theoretically should disincentivize investors from filing appraisal petitions solely to turn a profit from the statutory interest rate—a strategy known as "interest-rate arbitrage." But in amending the statute, the General Assembly did not specify whether the petitioning stockholders must return to the corporation any amount by which the prepayment exceeds the court's determination of fair value. The resulting ambiguity has not only caused uncertainty among litigants and costly motion practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery—a consequence, ironically, that the legislative amendment was aimed at avoiding—but has also diminished the amendment's effect on curbing interest-rate arbitrage and, more generally, appraisal arbitrage. This article explores the history behind the prepayment amendment, including the evolution of Delaware's appraisal statute and two Court of Chancery cases in which the Court foresaw the need for an effective prepayment system. This article also examines the legislative history of the 2016 amendment and other scholars' suggestions for dealing with the statutory ambiguity. Finally, the article offers a new model for legislative reform, one that retains section 262's core and advances the policy objectives that underlie Delaware's appraisal system.
机译:2016年,特拉华州大会修订了《特拉华州总公司法》第262条,为尚存的公司提供在评估案件中预付股东费用的选择。具体而言,该修正案为尚存的公司提供了选择权,可以选择在试验前支付其股票的公允价值,无论其选择的每股价格如何。这样做会减少预付款额的法定利息,从理论上讲,这应使投资者无权仅出于从法定利率中获利而提出评估请愿书,这种策略被称为“利率套利”。但是,在修改章程时,大会没有具体规定请愿股东是否必须将预付款超过法院公允价值确定的任何数额退还给公司。由此产生的歧义不仅导致诉讼人之间的不确定性和特拉华州法院的动议实践代价高昂(具有讽刺意味的是,该立法修正案旨在避免这种后果),而且还削弱了该修正案在抑制利率套利方面的作用,并且,一般而言,评估套利。本文探讨了预付款修正案背后的历史,包括特拉华州评估法规的演变以及法院预言了有效的预付款系统的必要性的两个法院案。本文还研究了2016年修正案的立法历史以及其他学者针对法律模糊性的建议。最后,本文提供了一种立法改革的新模式,该模式保留了第262条的核心内容,并提出了构成特拉华州评估体系基础的政策目标。

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  • 来源
    《The Business Lawyer》 |2018年第4期|1051-1092|共42页
  • 作者

    R. Garrett Rice;

  • 作者单位

    Lee University School of Law B.A. Lafayette College;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 04:51:14

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