A Study of Productive Expenditure Bias in County-level Finance in China

摘要

, , , 2067()2001—2005 , : Being responsible mainly to their superiors, decision-makers at the county level in China pursue the maximum growth rate rather than their residents’ welfare. This leads to a preference for productive expenditure in their fiscal decisions. An empirical test based on 2,067 counties (cities) provides robust evidence for the existence of productive expenditure bias at the county level. Such bias causes a serious impediment to the construction of a system of public finance and the transformation to public service-oriented government in China. An appropriate solution to this problem is to gradually enhance incentives for county- level governments to satisfy the demands of local residents.View full textDownload full textKeywordsfiscal expenditure structure, fiscal expenditure bias, county-level governmentRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2012.650414